Dunbar documents the preceding context well; who the players were, how the business worked, etc. We can then see how LTCM organically formed, burned incredibly bright, and exploded before our eyes in the late s, as widespread market irrationality and turmoil quickly exposed the oft taken-for-granted underlying assumptions of academic finance. I started working on the periphery of the financial markets in May so knew something big was happening with LTCM in Sept and that it was a huge structural problem for the market as a whole but hadnt really understood what had happed until I read this book. Dunbar keeps it as simple as possible without dumbing it down nor being patronising, a very tough skill that he achieved very well.
|Published (Last):||24 January 2015|
|PDF File Size:||4.88 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||11.76 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
The loosening of regulation in the last twenty years and the availability of inexpensive computing power has created markets that effect the lives of almost every US citizen. Mortgages are packaged bonds and traded in a huge mortgage backed securities market. This tends to assure that the interest rate a home buyer pays will be at a competitive rate. Many people have taken advantage of stock market gains via mutual funds. Venture capital funds the new companies, creating new jobs and wealth.
Markets have their dark side as well. During the Reagan years Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham used junk "high-yield" bonds to fund a vast corporate takeover boom that resulted in massive job losses, while enriching those who manipulated this game of greater fools.
The s are sometimes referred to as "the greed decade". A time when some people got rich or richer while others lost their jobs and houses. Even when the markets are not in the grips of excess, the rich benefit more than anyone else.
One of the benefits of being a "high net worth individual" is that you can invest in hedge funds, which are not regulated as mutual funds are. Compared to mutual funds, hedge funds offer a higher rate of return.
There is a reason that only "high net worth" individuals can invest in hedge funds. In many cases the returns produced by these funds are matched by the risk of financial loss. The US regulators and congress assume that high net worth individuals are experienced investors or at least that they can afford the potential losses associated with higher risk. On one level it is a story of hubris and arrogance. For anyone who works in a trading firm or who has even tangentially studied quantitative finance, the failure of LTCM is a cautionary tale about the limits of modern financial theory.
Nicholas Dunbar tells this facet of the story far better than Lowenstein. For the last four years Dunbar has been working as a journalist for financial publications. The rest of the book details the events that lead up to the failure. This is a powerful story telling technique. The story takes on a certain inevitability.
Instead of the Greek Gods pulling the threads of the tale, modern finance lurks behind the scenes. In the opening act John Meriwether, the founding partner of LTCM and one of the pioneers in bringing those trained in physics, mathematics and quantitative finance to Wall Street, is forced out of Salomon Brothers in a US Treasury Bill bidding scandal.
Rather than retire to an exclusive golf course, he founds LTCM. Meriwether recruits many of the top traders he worked with at Solomon Brother, along with some of the top people in academic quantitative finance. They are joined by an ex-Federal Reserve vice chairman. In the second act LTCM applies financial models that assume that markets are logical and will always tend toward equilibrium.
LTCM makes huge financial bets, in thousands of market positions. For four years LTCM shows excellent returns. As Dunbar describes it, LTCM ignored two underlying assumptions behind the market models they used: The models assumed that markets are always liquid e. Markets tend toward equilibrium, where "mispricings" are corrected.
During a market panic, liquidity dries up as investors move their money to safer investments. While market equilibrium may be true in the long run, there can be "mispricings" that can persist for periods of time long enough to lose five billion dollars.
In the end much of the personal wealth of the LTCM founders is destroyed. Disclaimer Nothing that is written here should be interpreted as reflecting the views of my employer. This review was written on my own time, using my own computing and Internet resources. The bearcave.
Obviously this is a book review, and so, a critical work. As a result, all quotes used in this review fall under the doctrine of fair use. In writing this review, I am not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. To borrow from Dr.
We rate each piece of content on a scale of 1—10 with regard to these two core criteria. Our rating helps you sort the titles on your reading list from adequate 5 to brilliant For instance, it may be offer decent advice in some areas but be repetitive or unremarkable in others. Often an instant classic and must-read for everyone. While the rating tells you how good a book is according to our two core criteria, it says nothing about its particular defining features.
Inventing Money: The Story of Long-Term Capital Management and the Legends Behind It